Historically, SIT's
simplicity principle is a descendant of Hochberg
and McAlister's (1953) minimum principle, and both are
information-theoretic translations of the law of
Prägnanz. This Gestalt law was proposed, in the early 20th
century, by Wertheimer (1912, 1923), Köhler (1920), and Koffka
(1935), and it refers to
the natural tendency of physical systems to settle
into relatively stable minimum-energy states to which, in the case of
the human visual
system in the brain,
preferred interpretations might correspond. Hochberg and McAlister
casted
this Gestalt idea in terms of representational compactness by replacing
minimum energy with minimum descriptive information. SIT added a
concrete coding language specifying the so-called transparent
holographic
regularities to be captured in descriptive codes. For the
mathematical
foundation
of SIT's coding language, see
Journal
of Mathematical
Psychology 1991, and for the psychological
foundation of the
transparent
holographic nature of visual regularity, see
Psychological
Review
1996 and
Psychological Review 2004.
SIT's simplicity principle concurs with the minimum description
length principle in the mathematical domain of algorithmic information
theory (AIT) that, also in the 1960s, was initiated by Kolmogorov and
Solomonoff. Until the 1990s, SIT and AIT evolved independently, and
indeed, there
are differences between SIT and AIT:
- SIT makes the perceptually relevant distinction
between structural and
metrical information -- AIT does not.
- SIT encodes for a restricted set of perceptually relevant
regularities -- AIT allows any imaginable regularity.
- In SIT, the relevant outcome of an encoding is a simplest
hierarchical organization -- in AIT, it is only a complexity value.
For the rest, however, SIT and AIT share many starting
points and objectives. SIT's
and AIT's modern information-theoretic approaches can be
said to present viable alternatives to Shannon's (1948) classical (or
selective)
information-theoretic approach and to the
classical Helmholtzian likelihood principle which, in vision, assumes
that the
preferred interpretation of a proximal stimulus is the one most likely
to be true in the world, that is, the one with the
highest probability of specifying the actual distal stimulus.
Just as Shannon's approach, the Helmholtzian likelihood principle
presupposes knowledge about probabilities in terms of, for
instance, frequencies of occurrence of things in the world. Such
probabilities, however, are often hardly quantifiable, if at all (
demo).
In SIT and AIT, this
problem is
circumvented by turning to precisals,
that is, artificial
probabilities derived from the length of shortest descriptive
codes. AIT has shown that precisals might well be
reliable alternatives for the often unknown real probabilities. In
vision, this
paved the way for a more detailed comparison of SIT's
simplicity principle and Bayesian implementations of the likelihood
principle (
demo).
This comparison revealed that precisals and real probabilities may be
far apart for viewpoint-independent factors (Bayesian priors) but
seem
close for viewpoint-dependent factors (Bayesian conditionals) which
are
decisive in the everyday perception by a moving observer. This implies
that
both the simplicity principle and the likelihood principle may have
guided
the evolution of the human visual system, the difference being
that
the likelihood principle assumes that the human visual system is a
special-purpose
system in that it is highly adapted to one specific world, whereas the
simplicity principle assumes it is a
general-purpose
system in that, as an emergent side-effect of the preference for
simplest
interpretations, it is fairly adaptive to many different worlds. For an
extensive discussion on these issues, see
Psychological Bulletin
2000, and for an updated brief discussion, see
Acta Psychologica
2011.
In Marr's (1982) terms, SIT began as a theory at the
computational level of description (
demo).
Just as Bayesian implementations of the likelihood principle, for
instance, SIT models vision as if it, somehow, considers all possible
interpretations before it selects a preferred interpretation. In both
cases, this implies a modeling (of the nature) of process
outcomes rather than of process
mechanisms. Nowadays, however, SIT also includes
process models. For instance, see
Psychological
Review
1999 for the so-called holographic
bootstrapping mechanism in the detection of visual
regularity (
demo), and see
Proceedings
of the
National Academy of Sciences USA 2004 for the
so-called transparallel
processing
mechanism in the selection of simplest interpretations.
This transparallel processing mechanism relies on so-called
hyperstrings
(
demo),
which are distributed representations that
enable
the processing of an exponential number of codes as if only one code
were
concerned (
demo).
This goes beyond the parallel distributed processing (PDP)
mechanism
in "neural" network models as considered in connectionism (
demo),
and has
an additional storage advantage: PDP models presuppose that all
possible outcomes for all possible inputs are represented beforehand in
a
network, whereas
SIT's transparallel processing mechanism performs an on-the-fly
construction
of all possible outcomes for only the input at
hand (
demo).
In
cognitive (neuro)science, the latter suggests that the relatively rigid
neural
network in the brain allows for flexible cognitive networks which
change
with
changing input. This agrees with the finding, in neuroscience, of
transient neural assemblies which seem to be involved in binding
similar features in the input, and which signal their presence
by
synchronous firing of the neurons involved (a topic which is also
studied in dynamic-systems approaches to cognition). This intriguing
connection between transparallel processing (a form of cognitive
processing) and neuronal synchronization (a form of neural processing)
has been explored in
Cognitive Processing
2012, leading to a concrete picture of flexible cognitive
architecture (constituted by hyperstring-like "gnosons" or "fundamental
particles of cognition") in between the relatively rigid level of
neurons and the still elusive level of consciousness (
demo).
For a book on these ideas, see
Simplicity in Vision
For a pdf-presentation on these ideas, see
Visual
regularity
or its printable
handout
For more details on methodological principles guiding these ideas, see
Marr's levels,
Research cycles, and
Metaphors of cognition
Applications
The conglomerate of ideas within
SIT has found
societal applications in art science and visual ergonomics. This led,
for instance, to traffic reconstructions yielding safer roads, bridges,
and tunnels (
demo). Furthermore,
during the past
decades, it has been applied to a wide range of topics in vision
science. See the book
Structural Information Theory for details about these topics which include:
- judged complexity (e.g., Leeuwenberg, 1969, 1971)
- neon effects (e.g., van Tuijl & Leeuwenberg, 1979)
- embeddedness (e.g., van Tuijl & Leeuwenberg, 1980)
- subjective contours (e.g., van Tuijl & Leeuwenberg,
1982)
- visual pattern completion and ambiguity (e.g., Buffart,
Leeuwenberg, & Restle, 1981, 1983)
- temporal order (e.g., Collard & Leeuwenberg, 1981)
- assimilation and contrast (e.g., Leeuwenberg, 1982)
- foreground-background (e.g., Leeuwenberg & Buffart,
1984)
- beauty (e.g., Boselie & Leeuwenberg, 1985)
- hidden figures (e.g., Mens & Leeuwenberg, 1988)
- serial pattern segmentation (e.g., van der Helm, van Lier,
&
Leeuwenberg, 1992; van
der Helm, 1994)
- hierarchy, unity, and variety (e.g., Leeuwenberg &
van
der
Helm, 1991;
Leeuwenberg, van
der
Helm, & van Lier, 1994;
van Lier, Leeuwenberg, & van der Helm, 1997)
- global and local visual pattern completions (e.g., van
Lier,
van
der Helm, & Leeuwenberg, 1994,
1995;
van Lier, Leeuwenberg, & van der Helm, 1995;
van Lier, 1999; de Wit & van
Lier, 2002; de Wit, Mol,
& van Lier, 2005; de Wit, Bauer,
Oostenveld, Fries, & van Lier, 2006; de Wit, Schlooz,
Hulstijn, van Lier, 2007; Vrins, de Wit,
& van Lier, 2009)
- serial pattern completion (e.g., Scharroo &
Leeuwenberg, 2000)
- object handedness (e.g., Leeuwenberg & van der
Helm,
2000)
- veridicality (e.g., Leeuwenberg & Boselie, 1988;
van
der Helm,
2000, 2007, 2011)
- visual regularity (e.g., van der Helm &
Leeuwenberg,
1991,
1996, 1999, 2004;
Csathó,
van der Vloed,
& van
der Helm, 2003, 2004; van
der Vloed, Csathó, & van der
Helm, 2005, 2007;
Treder & van der Helm, 2007;
van
der Helm, & Treder, 2009;
Treder, van der Vloed,
& van
der Helm, 2011; van der
Helm, 2004, 2010, 2011, 2012).