Probabilities presuppose
categories. The probability of throwing a "4" with a normal dice is 1/6
(or 16.6%) because a normal dice has six faces that each represent
another number category. For a dice with two "2"s, two "4"s, and two
"6"s, however, the probability of throwing a "4" is 1/3 (or
33.3%) because such a dice represents only three number
categories.
Usually, people have no problem with the probabilities involved in
simple
dice throwing. In general, however, people have a poor intuition for
everyday
probabilities when things become slightly more complicated ---
Test
your intuition
Often, people are hardly aware
that they use categories to estimate probabilities. Consider, for
instance, the following four outcomes of throwing two sticks randomly
on the floor:
Most people would
say intuitively
that the outcome at the left has a high probability and the outcome at
the right a low probability. This, however, is true only if one takes
each of these four outcomes as a representative of a category of similar outcomes.
Without presupposing such categories, every outcome would have the same
probability!
But, then, what are the categories? Why would the four outcomes belong
to different categories? Could yet further categories be distinguished?
How
many individual outcomes fall in a distinguishable category? Only
when
these questions have been given an answer, a probability can
be assigned
to an individual outcome.
These questions, however, may not have clear-cut answers at all. In the
19th century, Joseph Louis Bertrand (1889) realized that this is a
fundamental problem to probability theory. He formulated this problem
in the form of
a paradox that is illustrated by the following riddle:
If one excludes chords crossing the circle's center, there is even a third answer (a probability of
0.25).
One may have compelling arguments to choose a specific categorization,
but the point is that no categorization can be proved to be the one and
only "true" one.
Hence, probabilities depend on the chosen categorization of the things
involved, which is obtained by way of structural descriptions of those
individual things. In other words, structural descriptions precede
probabilities: one first needs a description language that
produces categories and, only then, probabilities can be
determined.
In perceptual organization, this means that one needs a structural
description language that produces the same categories of stimulus
interpretations as those produced by the human visual system. Only
then, one may assess the probabilities with which specific
interpretations are predicted to be perceived. Notice that, by
Bertrand's paradox, one can never prove that these perceptual
probabilities agree with "true" probabilities of occurrence of things in
the world.
For related demos, see
T-junctions,
Object versus viewer, and Occam, von Helmholtz, and Bayes
For an extensive discussion on
these issues, see
Psychological
Bulletin
2000
For an updated brief discussion on these issues, see
Acta Psychologica 2011