Description of my research interests

In the attempt to understand the nature of cognition, I regard the tools of conceptual analysis, experimental investigation (both psychological and neurophysiological), computational modeling and robotics to be on equal footing.
Cognitive science is challenging from a theoretical point of view because of its interdisciplinary nature, necessitating a clear perspective on the different levels of analysis and the related conceptual schemes that are ultimately to be combined into one unified science. A further challenge lies in the substantial consequences cognitive science can have for the tenability of the traditional conceptual repertoire (known as 'folk psychology') utilized in our daily description, explanation and prediction of ordinary human behavior.
In my publications, I have endeavored to relate theoretical issues such as these to current computational models and experimental data.
In my Ph. D project I have focussed on the debate between classical cognitivists and connectionists concerning the nature of representation (i.e. symbolic versus distributed representations) and the appropriate level of analysis of cognition. I connected these views to an analysis of the inability of computational models to deal with the infamous 'frame problem' (a problem related to common sense reasoning and non-demonstrative inference) and examined the consequences for the status of folk psychology. This work has resulted in a cum laude promotion, and has been published by Sage under the title 'Cognitive science and folk psychology: the right frame of mind'.

Since then I have extended my research by investigating the embeddedness and embodiment of cognition (EEC) in relation to dynamical systems theory (DST). The growing attention for EEC and DST has led to a variety of claims about a major new development in cognitive science, suggesting that the traditional cognitivist focus on purely internal information processing (representation and computation) is too restricted for a proper understanding of the nature of cognition.
Moreover, the increased attention for the dynamical aspects of brain processes provides a further incentive to reconsider the traditional views on representation. A proper and systematic understanding of the nature of representation, its form (e.g. symbolic, distributed or dynamic) and its content (e.g. propositional or behaviorial), is of crucial importance for cognitive science.

Part of my current research, therefore, is aimed at explicating the role of representation in neurodynamic models of cognitive behavior (especially categorization). I specifically focus on the consequences of the representation-debate for the frame problem.
I am taking a historical perspective on the recent developments by investigating the relationships between EEC and DST on the one hand and (early) associationistic and behavioristic traditions on the other.
Finally, I'm exploring ways to integrate these philosophical issues with empirical work (i.e. experiments, computational modeling, and robotics).

Automatic translation into Portuguese (errors to be expected)